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Abstract 
The European directive 2006/42/CE promulgates the machine safe design principles to prevent professional risks. However, outside machines 
that have specific safety standards, the designers of special machines and manufacturing systems can only use generic safety standards, limiting 
as a consequence the results of hazards detection. The aim of this paper is to present an original approach for this detection during the design of 
working equipment. 
We based our study on a hypothesis of the literature that links hazards to the presence of energy flows. Thus, the hazards detection is reduced to 
the study of the building of energy flows and the detection of potential links between these flows and the operator. Thanks to such data, the 
designer will be able to select the best risk prevention solutions. 
To reach this goal, we decided to use the Functional Energetic Model (FEMo) to model the technical system and its energy flows. This choice 
was made because this model was developed for the design of technical systems integrating different types of energy. By using this modelling, 
the designer can easily analyses every potential interactions between the energy flows and the operator, depending on the future working 
situations in each life cycle phases. Our approach builds on this model all along the design process, allowing the designer to early detect 
hazards and to apply at the best moment the risk prevention solutions. 
We present the application of this approach during the design of a working equipment, since the definition of the raw need. We confirm that its 
application and the system modelling in the EFM formalism are possible since the conceptual design phase. Data from the next design phases 
enrich the model, and consequently improve the detection and characterization of hazards. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the Scientific Committee of 48th CIRP Conference on MANUFACTURING SYSTEMS - CIRP CMS 
2015. 
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1. Introduction 
     In 2013, out of the 618,623 work accidents declared in 
France, about 8% were associated with machines, and thus 
partially to production equipment [1]. Regarding these 
accidents in particular, and more generally occupational 
health and safety, “design” is a path of prevention whose 
advantages no longer need demonstrating, as it involves 
“integrated prevention”. This consists in applying safe 
design principles to an item of equipment as early as 
possible, a process set out in European directive 
2006/42/EC known as “Machines” [2] and in the associated 
norms . The prevention strategy recommended in these texts 
focuses on the a priori evaluation of risks; it sets as 
objective for the machine designer the need to obtain the 
lowest possible level of residual risk in view of the state of 
the art.  
     However, apart from certain “standard” items of 
production equipment for which specific standards exist 
(known as type “C”) that incorporate this risk assessment, 
the designers of special production equipment can only rely 
on transversal standards (types “A” and “B”), especially 
standard ISO 12100 [3] relating to general design 
principles. It is also important to recall that “production 
equipment” design companies are mostly medium, small or 
very small enterprises. Indeed, according to the 2014 data 
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of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry in France, 
more than two thirds of these companies had fewer than 10 
employees and 90% had fewer than 50. Therefore since the 
designers belonging to these SMEs/VSEs (project 
managers, engineers and technicians of engineering offices) 
are not specialised in “prevention” and have no formal 
resources or tools adapted to perform a priori risk 
assessments, they are limited, on the one hand, to the risk 
families closest to their field of experience (for example, 
mechanical), and on the other hand, to carrying out this 
assessment more often at the end of the project, once all the 
technical solutions have been defined. Furthermore, the data 
required for risk assessments (seriousness, frequency and/or 
exposure, probability of occurrence, possibility of 
avoidance) are not directly linked to the design data, 
thereby widening the gap between design and safety. 
Occupational health and safety requirements are thus 
treated as constraints of adaptation and correction instead of 
design. 
     In response to this issue, we propose an approach to 
assist designers of special production machines to identify 
hazardous phenomena. As shown in figure 1, this approach, 
based on the Functional Energetic Model (FEMo) [4] must 
enable linking the parameters with those used in risk 
assessment methods (ISO 12100 [3] and ISO 14121 [5]). In 
particular, these works will be focused on architectural and 
detailed design phases since it is essentially in these phases 
that the technical choices that give rise to most hazardous 
phenomena are made.  
     To be the most efficient, this approach has to verify the 
four following characteristics: 
 
x generic:  in front of the different types of risks, the 
different design approaches followed and the sectors of 
activity of the enterprises concerned; 
x inductive: based on the design parameters (causes) to 
ascertain hazardous phenomena (effects); 
x dynamic and traceable: certainty of taking into 
account the evolution of the characteristics and the 
configuration of the system’s components during the 
different design phases, 
x integrated and/or compatible with current design 
tools and methods: this ensures interoperability. It 
must also be monitored and instrumented with 
indicators of potential risks in order to quantify and use 
the data. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Positioning of the risk identification approach proposed. 
2. Literature review 
     Initially, a literature study is performed in two areas: that 
of design in view to defining the impact of different 
approaches to the generation of design parameters, and that 
of integrating prevention in design to identify the 
parameters used to estimate risks.  
2.1. Definitions 
     For the sake of clarity, and on the basis of the literature, 
we propose a definition and a classification of some terms 
linked to design. Thus we consider that a design approach 
is a set of design phases (first stage design, detailed design, 
etc.), as they structure the design activities (structure of the 
control architecture, definition of system functions, etc.). 
The latter are composed of five design tasks, sources of 
design data (parameters, intermediate objects) (cf. fig. 2). 
The intermediate objects (IO) construct with a professional 
viewpoint the data flows between activities [6-8]. 
2.2. Design approaches  
     A large number of works on design approaches are 
identified in the literature to solve all kind of problems [9-
15]. They can mainly be distinguished by their way of 
organising the design phases and activities. However, the 
tasks [16] and intermediate objects (deliverables) [10] are 
generic. In his thesis on “project-data” interaction « during 
the design of a multi-technology product, Godot [16] 
established that a design activity could be summarised by 
the five following tasks: creation, dimensioning, 
representation, optimisation /evaluation and validation.  
      Our approach therefore will use these elementary tasks 
and the parameters generated from them, since they are 
independent from design approaches and their formalisation 
(cf. fig. 1). This point is essential as the enterprises targeted 
are mostly VSEs/SME which seldom take a formal 
approach to design. 
2.3. Risk prevention in design  
     Research works on integrating occupational risks in 
production system design mainly focuses on two areas: the 
design process and risk evaluation. In both cases, these 
works present limits regarding our problem. 
     Those who focus on the design process mostly propose 
methods that call on collaborative project reviews [17]. The 
reduction of risk in general, and the identification of 
hazardous phenomena in particular, are based on 
cooperation between the different actors during these 
project reviews. Therefore this type of approach does not 
guide the designer in decision-making when they work 
independently in front of their workstation [18]. 
Furthermore, when these project reviews are performed 
using numerical mock-ups or physical prototypes, this type 
of approach must be sufficiently advanced in the design 
process to analyse the risks [19]. 
     Regarding works on risk assessment, i.e. the 
determination of an index used to classify potential risks, 
they are generally specific to a single type, for example 
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mechanical risk [20]. Moreover, the methods proposed are 
essentially focused on the approach taken to combine the 
different parameters involved in assessing risks. These 
parameters are quite similar from one method to another. 
As recommended by standard ISO 12100 [3], these 
parameters include seriousness damage, frequency /duration 
of exposure, probability of occurrence of a hazardous event 
and the possibility of avoidance. The main difference 
between the methods proposed concerns the number of 
levels used to evaluate these parameters and how they are 
combined: matrix, graph, numerical equation, abacus, and 
chart. Consequently, these works do not provide a response 
to our problem, which is to identify hazardous phenomena.  
     Analysis of the literature nonetheless made it possible to 
identify three approaches that a priori provide a response to 
our problem and to the criteria expected (generic, inductive, 
dynamic and integrated): the works of Coulibaly et al. [21], 
the “PAG”  multi-agent system [22], the “IRAD” method  
[23] and the work situation model “MOSTRA” [24]. 
Respectively, they propose a Factor of Risk (FRis) 
indicating whether a risk is present or not, additional 
indicators for numerical mannequins, a method for 
simultaneously developing technical and safety functions 
and, lastly, a model that facilitates the inclusion of multi-
viewpoint data through the notion of risk,  
     Although the goals of these works are related to our 
problem, they sometimes require the generation of 
parameters that do not appear directly in design [21], or 
which intervene too late in the design process [22]. Also, 
they do not always explain how hazardous phenomena are 
identified [23].  Lastly, they do not systematically define 
the direct link between design parameters and hazardous 
phenomena [24].  
     In spite of the above, several of these works agree on the 
fact that hazardous phenomena are linked to the notion of 
energy [23, 25, 26]. Hazardous phenomena of mechanical, 
electric and thermal origin, and those linked to physical 
nuisances (noises, vibrations, electromagnetic radiation) can 
be linked directly to energy parameters (potential energy, 
kinetic energy, electric currents, thermal energy, 
electric/magnetic fields, acoustic power, etc.). 
     On the basis of this hypothesis, our problem is to 
identify energy flows. Thus we extended our literature 
analysis in this direction. Energy flows can be represented 
using different types of Bond-Graph model [27] and the 
functional energy model (FEMo). Initially developed to 
analyse existing complex systems, this model based on the 
notion of energy flow circulation has been completed to 
guide designers when designing a product [4]. As shown in 
figure 2 below, this model is based on four elements or 
representations:  
 
x frontiers that delimits a production system, a  
subsystem or a component in relation to its external 
environment; 
x functional surfaces that designate the interfaces via 
which a production system, a subsystem or a 
component has links with its environment. They are 
crossed by one or more energy flows and are 
characterized by extensive magnitudes (quantity of 
material, movement, energy, etc.); 
x links that associate two functional surfaces that do not 
belong to the same component. They therefore 
characterise the interfaces that can be classed into three 
types: conductive (C), semi-conductive (SC) or 
insulating (I); 
x internal links that associate two functional surfaces 
belonging to the same component. They can also be 
conductive, semi conductive or insulating.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Illustration of the elements of the functional energy model [4]. 
     Since this model also allows representing the operator(s) 
of the system with the same elements, we decided to build 
our approach on this basis in order to study the circulation 
of energy flows in a system, localise the links with the 
operators and thus identify the potentially hazardous 
phenomena. The fact that this model had already been the 
object of computerisation also partially responded to one of 
the criteria regarding the operational and integrated nature 
of the approach considered. An improvement of the 
integration is currently in progress. 
3. Approach 
3.1. General principles  
     The FEMo provides a global and uniform view of the 
different energy flows within a man/machine system. The 
identification of hazardous phenomena linked to these 
energy flows becomes systematic by identifying all the 
possible interactions between the operators and the 
functional surfaces of the system. It is through the latter that 
the energy flows of the system are transmitted. 
     The designer can therefore be made aware of these 
potential links. Then, they can define solutions on each of 
them to control the energy flows from the system to the 
operator and vice-versa (cf. fig. 3). Indeed, the operator can 
exert a “mechanical” energy which is a source of accidents 
(e.g. sudden movement against a sharp edge).  
 
 
Fig. 3. Identification and prevention of transfers of energy to the operator. 
     Depending on the type of energy (and thus hazardous 
phenomena) and their level, the links must either prohibit 
the passage of energy flows (e.g. contact with mobile 
transmission components), or control them (e.g. reduction 
of efforts to be provided by the operator). From this point, 
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these mechanisms become means of protection. This 
modelling of flows for future machine tools and working 
equipment can be reiterated to study the different phases of 
the life of the product to be designed (utilisation, 
maintenance, setting, etc.) to ensure a maximum level of 
safety throughout the life-cycle of the item of equipment. 
Thus the FEMo becomes an intermediate object capable of 
alerting designers and communicating on hazardous 
phenomena [6]. 
3.2. Extension of the FEMo to all hazardous phenomena  
     Initially, the FEMo was developed by modelling the 
main energy flows used in systems (mechanical, electric, 
electromagnetic) in view to analysing these systems. 
However, it is necessary to widen the notion of energy in 
order to deal with all the hazardous phenomena defined by 
standard ISO 12100. First, the notion of energy needed to 
be extended to allow the approach to work on hazard 
phenomena linked to noise, chemical products and the 
disrespect of ergonomic principles.  
     By reusing the concept of generalized variables [4], the 
generalised effort and generalised current of every type of 
energy can be defined to link them to the common notion of 
power. 
4. Proposal of a table of generalized variables and its use 
in hazard characterization 
     The mechanical domain was first described as 
comprising three types of energy: kinetic energy (part in 
movement), potential energy (the mass of objects) and 
elastic/static energy (pressurised gas, springs, etc.). This is 
expressed in the first three lines of table 1. 
     By analogy, and by using standards ISO 12100 
(mechanical), NF C15-100 and NF C13-200 (electric), NF 
X35-112 (thermal), NF EN 62471 (light radiation), NF EN 
60825 (laser), NF EN ISO 14253 (vibration), ISO 11688 
(acoustic), directive 98/24/EC (chemical/biological), NF 
EN 1005 (biomechanical) coupled with standard ISO 
14121, these generalised effort and current have defined the 
domains of chemistry, acoustics, and biomechanics. 
    These generalised variables or their combination 
(generalised power) will define the energy flows crossing 
the functional surfaces of the FEMo. It is therefore these 
that will give rise to “alerts” to the designer regarding the 
potential presence of hazardous phenomena. For example, 
the specification of a velocity of a part to the ground is a 
primary parameter for detecting kinetic energy. Indeed, the 
object driven by this velocity is a hazardous phenomenon of 
mechanical type due to its kinetic energy.  
     However, generalised variables are not enough to define 
a hazardous phenomenon with precision. Let us take the 
case of the generalised current (velocity) of a part in 
movement. The nature of the material (rigid or flexible) the 
state of the surface of the part in movement (ex. : smooth, 
rough), its shape (sharp or blunt edge), its position in 
relation to other fixed or mobile parts, etc. will have an 
impact as decisive on the level of risk as the initial energy 
parameters.  
 
Table 1. “Generalized” efforts and currents. 
Type of energy Generalised effort Generalised current 
Mechanical 
(translation) 
Kinetic energy, 
potential energy 
Force (N) Velocity (m/s) 
Mechanical 
(rotation) 
Kinetic energy 
Torque (Nm) Angular velocity 
(rad/s) 
Mechanical 
(pneumatic / 
hydraulic) 
Elastic/static energy 
Pressure (P) Flowrate (m^3/s) 
Electric Voltage (V) Intensity (A) 
Thermal Temperature (K) Heat flow (J/s=W) 
Radiation 
(electromagnetism) 
Magnetic fields 
(Tesla) 
Magnetic flux  
(Weber) 
Radiation (light) Wavelength (m) Spectral density 
(W/m) 
Radiation (laser) Wavelength (m) Photon flux (s-1) 
Vibration Acceleration (m.s-2) 
Exposure time (s) 
Acoustic Sound intensity (dB) Exposure time (s) 
Chemical / biological Chemical/biological 
potential  (J/mol) Molar flux (mol/s) 
Biomechanical Force (N) Velocity (m/s) and/or 
frequency 
 
     Likewise, regarding the domain of biomechanics, the 
efforts linked to the weight of a part to be handled and the 
frequency of this action are not enough to qualify the 
presence of a hazardous phenomenon linked to conformity 
or nonconformity with ergonomic principles. The shape of 
the part, the presence or absence of handles, the dimensions 
of the work station, etc. will determine the type of handling 
and posture, and thus have a decisive impact on the level of 
biomechanical stress. 
     Thus it can be seen that it is necessary to draw a “map” 
of the design parameters linked to each generalised variable 
to define the indicators that identify and characterise 
hazardous phenomena. These works are in progress and the 
map below the first elements involving mechanical risk (cf. 
fig.  4).  
 
 
Fig. 4. Extract of the causal diagram of design parameters for driving/trapping mechanical risk. 
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The links between the left trees and the right one represent 
the contribution of a parameters to the hazardous 
phenomenon of being drive or trap by a part animated by a 
velocity. This hazard exist since there is a velocity coupled 
with a torque or a force and a not smooth macroscopic 
surface or a bad surface state.  
     The completion of this map is currently in progress by 
using the previous references and particularly the different 
formulas used to assess risks. The main one linked the risk 
to the calculus of the severity of a damage and its likelihood 
of exposure. However, some risks are unavoidable and their 
assessment are linked to the dose of the hazard phenomenon 
received instead of the likelihood of exposure (ex.: heat, 
vibration, noise). Finally, risks linked to the disrespect of 
ergonomic principles are assessed by the analysis of the 
exertion required, the posture of the user and the frequency 
of this action.  
     Once completed, this map will be the base for the FEMo. 
Through the insertion of design parameters in the FEMo 
and combining them the way the map shows it, it is possible 
to study the construction of a hazard phenomenon and 
eventually inform the designer of its evolution. Thus, he 
might be able to act before the complete construction of the 
hazard.  
5. Discussion 
     Modelling an item of production equipment with FEMo 
can therefore be performed from the architectural design 
phase and more particularly when a flowchart or kinematic 
diagram of the system structuring elements is available. 
Plus, this model was used by different group of student and 
none had any problem to use it, nor have results about the 
identification of hazard phenomena. This model makes it 
possible to represent on the same diagram all the energy 
flows within the limits of the system during a chosen phase 
of life or work situation.  
     In order to make an exhaustive survey of the hazardous 
phenomena linked to the system, this model must be 
applied to all the phases of life and work situations having 
different energy configurations. The energies present and 
the potential interactions with the operators are not 
necessarily the same in the assembly, production or 
maintenance phases.  
The map of links between the design parameters and those 
used for the risk analysis should then permit characterising 
the functional surfaces of the FEMo to provide increasingly 
more detailed information on potential hazardous 
phenomena to the designer. 
     Figure 5 shows the sequence of the different steps of the 
approach proposed: from the identification of energies 
present in the system to the characterisation of hazardous 
phenomena. 
     To finalise our approach, and in addition to the “map” of 
design parameters mentioned previously, our works are 
continuing in two directions:  
 
x The first focuses on the dynamic treatment of the 
parameters and the traceability of the process to allow 
the designer to modify decisions taken earlier. 
x The second focuses on the approach to the conceptual 
design phase, and more specifically from the creation 
of the functional architecture. The difficulty lies in the 
fact that this stage comprises few or non-defined 
energy flows. The main energy information that can 
nonetheless be used is that linked to the stakeholders: 
the type and characteristics of the materials and 
consumables used (the cutting capacity of a tool or 
metal strip, the toxicity of a solvent, glue application 
temperature, etc.). 
 
 
   Fig. 5. Proposal of design parameter analysis (white) – and parameters 
used in the risk analysis (black). 
     By obtaining this information about the hazardous 
phenomena of his work throughout the design phase, the 
designer can therefore define the means for prevention 
which will evolve at the same time as the technical 
solutions, facilitating their structural, energetic and logical 
integration. 
     This study is currently being performed in the 
framework of a PhD thesis in the joint INRS-ENSAM 
laboratory. The different points raised are therefore in the 
process of development in order to obtain a fully functional 
approach. 
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